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Results for 'Lynne Moss Bahr'
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- "The time is fulfilled": Jesus's apocalypticism in the context of continental philosophy.Lynne Moss Bahr - 2019 - New York: T&T Clark.In this study, Lynne Moss Bahr explores the concept of temporality as central to Jesus's proclamation of the Kingdom of God. Using insights from Continental philosophy on the messianic, which expose the false claim that time progresses in a linear continuum, Bahr presents these philosophical positions in critical dialogue with the sayings of Jesus regarding time and time's fulfillment. She shows how the Kingdom represents the possibilities of a disruption in time, one that reveals the intrinsic (...)
- Proceedings of the 4th World Conference on Research Integrity: Brazil, Rio de Janeiro. 31 May - 3 June 2015.Lex Bouter, Melissa S. Anderson, Ana Marusic, Sabine Kleinert, Susan Zimmerman, Paulo S. L. Beirão, Laura Beranzoli, Giuseppe Di Capua, Silvia Peppoloni, Maria Betânia de Freitas Marques, Adriana Sousa, Claudia Rech, Torunn Ellefsen, Adele Flakke Johannessen, Jacob Holen, Raymond Tait, Jillon Van der Wall, John Chibnall, James M. DuBois, Farida Lada, Jigisha Patel, Stephanie Harriman, Leila Posenato Garcia, Adriana Nascimento Sousa, Cláudia Maria Correia Borges Rech, Oliveira Patrocínio, Raphaela Dias Fernandes, Laressa Lima Amâncio, Anja Gillis, David Gallacher, David Malwitz, Tom Lavrijssen, Mariusz Lubomirski, Malini Dasgupta, Katie Speanburg, Elizabeth C. Moylan, Maria K. Kowalczuk, Nikolas Offenhauser, Markus Feufel, Niklas Keller, Volker Bähr, Diego Oliveira Guedes, Douglas Leonardo Gomes Filho, Vincent Larivière, Rodrigo Costas, Daniele Fanelli, Mark William Neff, Aline Carolina de Oliveira Machado Prata, Limbanazo Matandika, Sonia Maria Ramos de Vasconcelos & Karina de A. Rocha - 2016 - Research Integrity and Peer Review 1 (Suppl 1).Table of contentsI1 Proceedings of the 4th World Conference on Research IntegrityConcurrent Sessions:1. Countries' systems and policies to foster research integrityCS01.1 Second time around: Implementing and embedding a review of responsible conduct of research policy and practice in an Australian research-intensive universitySusan Patricia O'BrienCS01.2 Measures to promote research integrity in a university: the case of an Asian universityDanny Chan, Frederick Leung2. Examples of research integrity education programmes in different countriesCS02.1 Development of a state-run “cyber education program of research ethics” in (...)No categories
- Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.Traditional procedures for rational updating fail when it comes to self-locating opinions, such as your credences about where you are and what time it is. This paper develops an updating procedure for rational agents with self-locating beliefs. In short, I argue that rational updating can be factored into two steps. The first step uses information you recall from your previous self to form a hypothetical credence distribution, and the second step changes this hypothetical distribution to reflect information you have genuinely (...)
- Integrity.Lynne McFall - 1987 - Ethics 98 (1):5-20.
- Authority and Gender: Flipping the F-Switch.Lynne Tirrell - 2018 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 4 (3).The very rules of our language games contain mechanisms of disregard. Philosophy of language tends to treat speakers as peers with equal discursive authority, but this is rare in real, lived speech situations. This paper explores the mechanisms of discursive inclusion and exclusion governing our speech practices, with a special focus on the role of gender attribution in undermining women’s authority as speakers. Taking seriously the metaphor of language games, we must ask who gets in the game and whose moves (...)
- Toxic Speech: Inoculations and Antidotes.Lynne Tirrell - 2018 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 56 (S1):116-144.Toxic speech inflicts individual and group harm, damaging the social fabric upon which we all depend. To understand and combat the harms of toxic speech, philosophers can learn from epidemiology, while epidemiologists can benefit from lessons of philosophy of language. In medicine and public health, research into remedies for toxins pushes in two directions: individual protections (personal actions, avoidances, preventive or reparative tonics) and collective action (specific policies or widespread “inoculations” through which we seek herd immunity). This paper is the (...)
- Metaphysics and mental causation.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1995 - In Pascal Engel (ed.), Mental causation. Oxford University Press. pp. 75-96.My aim is twofold: first, to root out the metaphysical assumptions that generate the problem of mental causation and to show that they preclude its solution; second, to dissolve the problem of mental causation by motivating rejection of one of the metaphysical assumptions that give rise to it. There are three features of this metaphysical background picture that are important for our purposes. The first concerns the nature of reality: all reality depends on physical reality, where physical reality consists of (...)
- Sound to meaning correspondences facilitate word learning.Lynne C. Nygaard, Allison E. Cook & Laura L. Namy - 2009 - Cognition 112 (1):181-186.
- "Listen to What You Say": Rwanda's Postgenocide Language Policies.Lynne Tirrell - 2015 - New England Journal of Public Policy 27 (4).Freedom of expression is considered a basic human right, and yet most countries have restrictions on speech they deem harmful. Following the genocide of the Tutsi, Rwanda passed a constitution (2003) and laws against hate speech and other forms of divisionist language (2008, 2013). Understanding how language shaped “recognition harms” that both constitute and fuel genocide also helps account for political decisions to limit “divisionist” discourse. When we speak, we make expressive commitments, which are commitments to the viability and value (...)
- Seeing Metaphor as Seeing‐As: Remarks on Davidson's Positive View of Metaphor.Lynne Tirrell - 2008 - Philosophical Investigations 14 (2):143-154.Davidson suggests that metaphor is a pragmatic (not a semantic) phenomenon; on his view, metaphor is a perlocutionary effect prompts its audience to see one thing as another. Davidson rightly attacks speaker-intentionalism as the source of metaphorical meaning, but settles for an account that depends on audience intentions. A better approach would undermine intentionalism per se, replacing it with a social practice analysis based on patterns of extending the metaphor. This paper shows why Davidson’s perceptual model fails to stave off (...)
- The Semantics of Prosody: Acoustic and Perceptual Evidence of Prosodic Correlates to Word Meaning.Lynne C. Nygaard, Debora S. Herold & Laura L. Namy - 2009 - Cognitive Science 33 (1):127-146.This investigation examined whether speakers produce reliable prosodic correlates to meaning across semantic domains and whether listeners use these cues to derive word meaning from novel words. Speakers were asked to produce phrases in infant‐directed speech in which novel words were used to convey one of two meanings from a set of antonym pairs (e.g., big/small). Acoustic analyses revealed that some acoustic features were correlated with overall valence of the meaning. However, each word meaning also displayed a unique acoustic signature, (...)
- What Genes Can't Do.Lenny Moss - 2003 - MIT Press.A historical and critical analysis of the concept of the gene that attempts to provide new perspectives and metaphors for the transformation of biology and its philosophy.
- A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science.Lynne Rudder Baker & Paul M. Churchland - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (4):906.
- Aristotle on the apparent good: perception, phantasia, thought, and desire.Jessica Dawn Moss - 2012 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.Pt. I. The apparent good. Evaluative cognition -- Perceiving the good -- Phantasia and the apparent good -- pt. II. The apparent good and non-rational motivation. Passions and the apparent good -- Akrasia and the apparent good -- pt. III. The apparent good and rational motivation. Phantasia and deliberation -- Happiness, virtue, and the apparent good -- Practical induction -- Conclusion : Aristotle's practical empiricism.
- On the Semantics and Pragmatics of Epistemic Vocabulary.Sarah Moss - 2015 - Semantics and Pragmatics.This paper motivates and develops a novel semantics for several epistemic expressions, including possibility modals and indicative conditionals. The semantics I defend constitutes an alternative to standard truth conditional theories, as it assigns sets of probability spaces as sentential semantic values. I argue that what my theory lacks in conservatism is made up for by its strength. In particular, my semantics accounts for the distinctive behavior of nested epistemic modals, indicative conditionals embedded under probability operators, and instances of constructive dilemma (...)
- Comment on Tracie Mahaffey's "A Friend in Need.Lynne Spellman - 2006 - Southwest Philosophy Review 22 (2):95-97.No categories
- DI9: An Exegetical Stalemate.Lynne Spellman - 1980 - Apeiron 14 (2):115.
- Forthcoming Sea Fights.Lynne Spellman - 1981 - New Scholasticism 55 (1):52-68.No categories
- Specimens of Natural Kinds and the Apparent Inconsistency of Metaphysics Zeta.Lynne Spellman - 1989 - Ancient Philosophy 9 (1):49-65.
- Perpetrators and Social Death: A Cautionary Tale.Lynne Tirrell - 2016 - Metaphilosophy 47 (4-5):585-606.Understanding evil requires both addressing the grave wrongs done to the victim and addressing the perpetrator who does these wrongs. Claudia Card's concept of social vitality was developed to explain what génocidaires destroy in their victims. This essay brings that concept into conversation with perpetrator testimony, arguing that the génocidaires’ desire for their own social vitality, achieved through their destruction of the social world of their targets, in fact boomerangs to corrode the vitality of their own lives. This is true (...)
- Why constitution is not identity.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1997 - Journal of Philosophy 94 (12):599-621.
- Epistemology Formalized.Sarah Moss - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (1):1-43.This paper argues that just as full beliefs can constitute knowledge, so can properties of your credence distribution. The resulting notion of probabilistic knowledge helps us give a natural account of knowledge ascriptions embedding language of subjective uncertainty, and a simple diagnosis of probabilistic analogs of Gettier cases. Just like propositional knowledge, probabilistic knowledge is factive, safe, and sensitive. And it helps us build knowledge-based norms of action without accepting implausible semantic assumptions or endorsing the claim that knowledge is interest-relative.
- 25th Workshop on Logic, Language, Information and Computation.Lawrence Moss, Maricarmen Martinez, Xavier Caicedo & Ruy de Queiroz - 2019 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 27 (5):766-776.
- Explaining Attitudes: A Practical Approach to the Mind.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1995 - New York: Cambridge University Press.Explaining Attitudes develops a new account of propositional attitudes - practical realism.
- Has content been naturalized?Lynne Rudder Baker - 1991 - In Barry M. Loewer (ed.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.The Representational Theory of the Mind (RTM) has been forcefully and subtly developed by Jerry A. Fodor. According to the RTM, psychological states that explain behavior involve tokenings of mental representations. Since the RTM is distinguished from other approaches by its appeal to the meaning or "content" of mental representations, a question immediately arises: by virtue of what does a mental representation express or represent an environmental property like coto or shoe? This question asks for a general account of the (...)
- Judgment and Justification.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (3):481.No categories
- III. On the very idea of a form of life.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1984 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 27 (1-4):277-289.Drawing on writers as diverse as Saul Kripke, Stanley Cavell, G. E. M. Anscombe, Jonathan Lear, and Bernard Williams, I offer an interpretation of Wittgenstein's key notion of a form of life that explains why Wittgenstein was so enigmatic about it. Then, I show how Hilary Putnam's criticism of Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics and Richard Rorty's support of (what he takes to be) Wittgenstein's legacy in the philosophy of mind both require mistaken assumptions about Wittgenstein's idea of a form of (...)
- On the Pragmatics of Counterfactuals.Sarah Moss - 2010 - Noûs 46 (3):561-586.Recently, von Fintel (2001) and Gillies (2007) have argued that certain sequences of counterfactuals, namely reverse Sobel sequences, should motivate us to abandon standard truth conditional theories of counterfactuals for dynamic semantic theories. I argue that we can give a pragmatic account of our judgments about counterfactuals without giving up the standard semantics. In particular, I introduce a pragmatic principle governing assertability, and I use this principle to explain a variety of subtle data concerning reverse Sobel sequences.
- Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1987 - Behavior and Philosophy 18 (2):61-66.
- Credal Dilemmas.Sarah Moss - 2014 - Noûs 48 (3):665-683.Recently many have argued that agents must sometimes have credences that are imprecise, represented by a set of probability measures. But opponents claim that fans of imprecise credences cannot provide a decision theory that protects agents who follow it from foregoing sure money. In particular, agents with imprecise credences appear doomed to act irrationally in diachronic cases, where they are called to make decisions at earlier and later times. I respond to this claim on behalf of imprecise credence fans. Once (...)
- Rape and Responsibility.Lynne Henderson - 1992 - Law and Philosophy 11 (1/2):127 - 178.
- Cognitive suicide.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1988 - In Robert H. Grimm & Daniel Davy Merrill (eds.), Contents of Thought. Tucson. pp. 401--13.
- The ontology of artifacts.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2004 - Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):99 – 111.Beginning with Aristotle, philosophers have taken artifacts to be ontologically deficient. This paper proposes a theory of artifacts, according to which artifacts are ontologically on a par with other material objects. I formulate a nonreductive theory that regards artifacts as constituted by - but not identical to - aggregates of particles. After setting out the theory, I rebut a number of arguments that disparage the ontological status of artifacts.
- Right Reason in Plato and Aristotle: On the Meaning of Logos.Jessica Moss - 2014 - Phronesis 59 (3):181-230.Something Aristotle calls ‘right logos’ plays a crucial role in his theory of virtue. But the meaning of ‘logos’ in this context is notoriously contested. I argue against the standard translation ‘reason’, and—drawing on parallels with Plato’s work, especially the Laws—in favor of its being used to denote what transforms an inferior epistemic state into a superior one: an explanatory account. Thus Aristotelian phronēsis, like his and Plato’s technē and epistēmē, is a matter of grasping explanatory accounts: in this case, (...)
- Dretske on the explanatory role of belief.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 63 (July):99-111.
- Scoring Rules and Epistemic Compromise.Sarah Moss - 2011 - Mind 120 (480):1053-1069.It is commonly assumed that when we assign different credences to a proposition, a perfect compromise between our opinions simply ‘splits the difference’ between our credences. I introduce and defend an alternative account, namely that a perfect compromise maximizes the average of the expected epistemic values that we each assign to alternative credences in the disputed proposition. I compare the compromise strategy I introduce with the traditional strategy of compromising by splitting the difference, and I argue that my strategy is (...)
- The Rhetorics of Feminism: Readings in Contemporary Cultural Theory and the Popular Press.Lynne Pearce & Walter J. Ong - 2004 - Psychology Press.This work explores the vast differences between oral and literate cultures, offering an account of the intellectual, literary and social effects of writing, print and electronic technology.
- A Call for the Inclusion of Mixed Methods Research in the Undergraduate Psychology Curriculum.Lynne D. Roberts & Peter J. Allen - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
- The First-Person Perspective.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2018 - Philosophia Christi 20 (1):61-66.Baker rejects naturalistic views that exclude first-person facts. Persons are emergent, constituted entities having first-person perspectives that are ineliminable, first-personal, dispositional, multi-stage properties. Persons appear gradually with FPPs in the rudimentary stage, but are distinguished by the later, robust stage. We possess first-person perspectives essentially and thereby have first-personal persistence conditions. Transtemporal identity is unanalyzable, requiring a variant of the Simple View. All that can be said is that a person exists whenever her FPP is exemplified. The view is “not-so-simple” (...)
- ‘Virtue Makes the Goal Right.Jessica Moss - 2011 - Phronesis 56 (3):204-261.Aristotle repeatedly claims that character-virtue “makes the goal right“, while Phronesis is responsible for working out how to achieve the goal. Many argue that these claims are misleading: it must be intellect that tells us what ends to pursue. I argue that Aristotle means just what he seems to say: despite putative textual evidence to the contrary, virtue is (a) a wholly non-intellectual state, and (b) responsible for literally supplying the contents of our goals. Furthermore, there are no good textual (...)
- Naturalism and the first-person perspective.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2007 - In Georg Gasser (ed.), How Successful is Naturalism? Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. pp. 203-226.The first-person perspective is a challenge to naturalism. Naturalistic theories are relentlessly third-personal. The first-person perspective is, well, first-personal; it is the perspective from which one thinks of oneself as oneself* without the aid of any third-person name, description, demonstrative or other referential device. The exercise of the capacity to think of oneself in this first-personal way is the necessary condition of all our self-knowledge, indeed of all our self-consciousness. As important as the first-person perspective is, many philosophers have not (...)
- Explaining Attitudes: A Practical Approach to the Mind.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1995 - Philosophy 72 (279):143-147.No categories
- Developing a framework for assessing responsible conduct of research education programs.Lynne E. Olson - 2010 - Science and Engineering Ethics 16 (1):185-200.Education in the responsible conduct of research (RCR) in the United States has evolved over the past decade from targeting trainees to including educational efforts aimed at faculty and staff. In addition RCR education has become more focused as federal agencies have moved to recommend specific content and to mandate education in certain areas. RCR education has therefore become a research-compliance issue necessitating the development of policies and the commitment of resources to develop or expand systems for educating faculty and (...)
- Human Persons as Social Entities.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2014 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):77-87.The aim of this article is to show that human persons belong, ontologically, in social ontology. After setting out my views on ontology, I turn to persons and argue that they have first-person perspectives in two stages (rudimentary and robust) essentially. Then I argue that the robust stage of the first-person persective is social, in that it requires a language, and languages require linguistic communities. Then I extend the argument to cover the rudimentary stage of the first-person perspective as well. (...)
- On a causal theory of content.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1989 - Philosophical Perspectives 3:165-186.The project of explaining intentional phenomena in terms of nonintentional phenomena has become a central task in the philosophy of mind.' Since intentional phenomena like believing, desiring, intending have content essentially, the project is one of showing how semantic properties like content can be reconciled with nonsemantic properties like cause. As Jerry A. Fodor put it, The worry about representation is above all that the semantic (and/or the intentional) will prove permanently recalcitrant to integration in the natural order; for example (...)
- Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):251-278.This paper argues that several leading theories of subjunctive conditionals are incompatible with ordinary intuitions about what credences we ought to have in subjunctive conditionals. In short, our theory of subjunctives should intuitively display semantic humility, i.e. our semantic theory should deliver the truth conditions of sentences without pronouncing on whether those conditions actually obtain. In addition to describing intuitions about subjunctive conditionals, I argue that we can derive these ordinary intuitions from justified premises, and I answer a possible worry (...)
- Time-Slice Epistemology and Action Under Indeterminacy.Sarah Moss - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 172--94.This paper defines and defends time-slice epistemology, according to which there are no essentially diachronic norms of rationality. First I motivate and distinguish two notions of time-slice epistemology. Then I defend time-slice theories of action under indeterminacy, i.e. theories about how you should act when the outcome of your decision depends on some indeterminate claim. I raise objections to a theory of action under indeterminacy recently defended by Robbie Williams, and I propose some alternative theories in its place. Throughout this (...)
- When does a person begin?Lynne Rudder Baker - 2005 - Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):25-48.According to the Constitution View of persons, a human person is wholly constituted by (but not identical to) a human organism. This view does justice both to our similarities to other animals and to our uniqueness. As a proponent of the Constitution View, I defend the thesis that the coming-into-existence of a human person is not simply a matter of the coming-into-existence of an organism, even if that organism ultimately comes to constitute a person. Marshalling some support from developmental psychology, (...)$37.00 new (collection) View on Amazon.comDirect download (9 more)Export citation
Bookmark 31 citations - Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):127-129.No categories
- Replies.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):623-635.Persons and Bodies develops and defends an account of persons and of the relation between human persons and their bodies. Human persons are constituted by bodies, without being identical to the bodies that constitute them—just as, I argue, statues are constituted by pieces of bronze, say, without being identical to the pieces of bronze that constitute them. The relation of constitution, therefore, is not peculiar to persons and their bodies, but is pervasive in the natural world.
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